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ABSTRACT
The message layer is a critical part of a network protocol stack. The quality of
the protocol implementation is closely tied to that of the message layer. The respon-
sibilities of the message layer include conversion between binaries from the network
interface and message structures in the device memory, along with validation of these
messages. Design and implementation of the message layer pose major challenges,
especially for modern protocols that have complex message structures. Poor design
choices and errors in the implementation lead to safety issues, performance inefficien-
cies, and expose vulnerabilities, opening door to potential exploitations and attacks.
In this thesis we develop a systematic approach to design and implementation
of efficient and correct-by-construction message layer components of the protocol
stack. To achieve this goal, we identify some common design trade-offs and evaluate
their impacts on performance and/or safety using the OpenFlow protocol as a case
study. A performance benchmarking framework leveraging existing tools is developed
to conduct these evaluations. Furthermore, the thesis develops a framework for
conformance verification. The conformance framework proposes a methodology that
generates test messages to identify vulnerabilities in the message layer. In particular,
we present an algorithm that minimizes the number of required test messages by
exploiting the structure of the message format.
A safe message layer is developed as part of the Flowgrammmable OpenFlow
stack. Flowgrammable and several existing OpenFlow stack implementations, such
as Beacon Controller and CPqD Soft Switch, are evaluated using both proposed
conformance and performance frameworks. It is shown that unlike Flowgrammable,
implementations of Beacon and CPqD Soft Switch message layer contain confor-
ii
mance violations. Furthermore, design choices such as omitting semantic checking,
inlining small and frequently used functions, and header optimization can yield per-
formance gain in protocol stack implementations. The work can be extended by
automating the message layer implementation and testing by using a programming
language approach. Even though OpenFlow is used as an example, the work can
be applied to improve the performance and level of conformance in other network
protocols as well. This thesis intends to help developers take a more systematic ap-
proach and make better design choices in implementing a conformant message layer
for a broad range of network protocols.
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NOMENCLATURE
LTE Long Term Evolution
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TCP Transmission Control Protocol
UDP User Datagram Protocol
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HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
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1. INTRODUCTION
Today’s computing and networking systems are characterized by increasing com-
plexity, multiple administrative domains, diversity of basic components, and increas-
ing uncertainty about their underlying topology and internal structure, cross-layer
interactions, and administration policies. At the same time, there is a competitive
pressure to quickly deploy large-scale networking systems that use a large number of
network protocols.
Protocols are an essential element any networking system. In recent years, there
is an explosion in the number of network protocols for both wireless and wireline
communications. The protocols are being implemented a wide range of devices, such
as smartphone, personal computers and high end servers. Many protocol stacks are
being implemented by both commercial and open source communities.
Different protocol stacks have different goals. For example, the protocol stacks
developed for the servers need to maximize the availability whereas the protocol
stacks developed for smartphones need to be power efficient. The complexity of the
protocols has been increasing as well. New protocols such as LTE needed to be
defined by lengthy specification. A complete protocol stack includes many different
protocols spanning multiple layers, resulting in a even higher complexity.
While the design of networks with higher throughput and lower delays has at-
tracted a significant interest from the research community, design of practical tools
that enable correct-by-construction networking systems has not received sufficient
attention. Current implementations of network protocols rely on an ad hoc rather
than a systematic approaches. There are little tools available for network engineer to
design, implement, and verify the performance of reliable and robust protocol stack.
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Using a modular approach, an implementation of a network protocol stack can
be divided into four major components in general: message layer, state machine,
system interface, and configurations, as shown in Figure 1.1 [1]. The message layer
is responsible for conversion between the the bit stream received from a network-
ing card and data structures residing in the memory on the same device. All other
components use message layer as the underlying instrument to perform their func-
tions. State machine keeps track of the protocol state based upon the sequence of
messages received and processed. The configuration component provides parameters
for protocol stack operation, such as identify numbers and network addresses. Sys-
tem interface specifies the functions through which the protocol interacts with the
underlying machine environment. It helps facilitate the transmission of binaries that
are being handled by the message layer.
A successful message layer implementation should be both safe and efficient.
These characteristics not only prevent the exposure of potential vulnerabilities to the
external world but lead to a better throughput of network devices. The quality of
the message layer directly affects the other components because of their dependence
on the message layer. In particular, state machine cannot successfully perform its
duties without a solid underlying message layer. Since the message layer is a critical
and complex component of the protocol stack, it is worthwhile to isolate it from
the other parts of the protocol stack implementation in order to study methods to
improve its performance and level of conformance.
2
Initial Configurations
Message Layer State Machine
System Interface
Figure 1.1: Major Components of a Network Protocol
It is challenging to have a conformant and efficient implementation, especially
for protocols with complex message structures. As shown in Figure 1.2, mistakes
and vulnerabilities exist in the implementations of some of the most widely used
protocols by mature commercial companies and open source projects [1]. There are
many open questions related to the implementation of the message layer of a net-
work protocol, such as OpenFlow. The questions can be classified as one of the two
major categories: conformance or performance. Some questions about conformance
include: how do we know our implementation is being conformant to the protocol
specifications? How do we design a verification process for the message layer that
can be executed in a relatively short amount of time but yet still have a good cov-
erage on potential vulnerabilities? How do we make the verification results can be
used directly to eliminate those vulnerabilities? On the other hand, some questions
regarding performance include: how do we characterize the performance of a mes-
sage layer implementation? What are some major design choices and how do those
choices affect safety and performance?
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of the other protocol. Figure 1 illustrates the decomposition of a protocol specification and an example of a system of
protocols.
This abstraction is useful for several reasons. First, it is fairly close to the specification style of protocols in
standards documentation. Second, it represents a natural division of a protocol into isolated components that have
minimum interdependencies, which is useful for independent construction and integration, rapid fault isolation, and
troubleshooting. Finally, it provides a clear cross section of a protocol to apply our research one component at a time.
2.2 Message Layer Constraints
The message handling layer of any network protocol is notoriously difficult to implement correctly. Common errors
include: accepting or allowing the creation of malformed messages, using incorrect byte ordering or byte alignment,
using undefined values, etc. (§2.2.1). These defects lead to problems in stability, security, performance, and cost
for network systems. Table 1, the result of a survey of the US-CERT Vulnerability Database [22], demonstrates that
sophisticated organizations implementing mature protocols commit these errors. The persistent introduction of these
defects is not the sign of an engineering problem, but a failure to use the correct levels of abstraction when working
with network protocols.
Message handling has been the focus of several research efforts. When the wire-format of the message is not
important, serialization solutions can be used [56, 19]. However, with network protocols, because of interoperability
requirements, adherence to the specific wire-format is necessary. As a result, a series of Domain Specific Languages
(DSLs) that allow programmer control over the wire-format have been designed. These approaches synthesize data
structures to hold messages and the typical operations necessary to manipulate them using correct by construction
techniques [34, 1, 40]. Language researchers have improved upon these DSLs with rich type systems that can prove
certain safety properties, and address some of the problems mentioned previously [16, 17]. Other work developed
static analysis techniques, that require no domain knowledge, to survey existing code bases and find occurrences of
some of the previously mentioned defects [10].
Systematically eliminating the categories of message related defects requires rich type systems and whole program
analysis, which is not supported by existing declarative DSLs. Invariants and semantic information produced by the
DSL is not incorporated or used in program analysis by the target language. Furthermore, finding all occurrences of
message related defects requires some level of domain knowledge during static analysis. This must either be built in to
the language, or programmer specified in a way that resembles existing network protocol specifications. Analysis by
formal methods should be a by-product of compiling the network program, and not require any specialized knowledge
by the programmer. Our work-in-progress develops a systems programming language to address these issues. This
allows for full program analysis, providing stronger safety guarantees and offering domain specific optimization that
is exceedingly difficult to accomplish by hand or impossible with a DSL.
Table 1: Message Related Vulnerabilities
Proto. Age Bug Date Vendor Error CERT #
802.11i 2004 2012 Broadcom semantic 160027
OSPFv2 1998 2012 Quagga struct 551715
NTPD 1985 2009 GNU struct 853097
ICMP 1981 2007 Cisco both 341288
VTP 1996 2006 Cisco semantic 821420
Bootp 1985 2006 Apple struct 776628
2.2.1 Message Vulnerabilities
There are three categories of message vulnerabilities that we address: structural constraint violation, semantic con-
straint violation, and unsafe access of conditional fields. In this section we describe these categories in detail with
examples using the OpenFlow v1.0 protocol [36]. We first briefly describe the protocol and then show vulnerability
examples.
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Figure 1.2: Sample Message Layer Vulnerabilities in Existing Implementations.
The objective of this thesis is to address these questions by using the message layer
of OpenFlow as a case study. There are three major objectives for this thesis. The
first one is to design and implement a correct-by-construction OpenFlow message
layer. The second objective is to develop a verification framework that generates
test cases to examine the level of conformance in several existing OpenFlow message
layer implementations. Finally, the last one is to measure the performance impact of
some design choices. With conformance and performance frameworks demonstrating
the level of safety and efficiency, this work contributes to better understanding of
design trade-offs and presents a systematic and disciplined approach for design and
implementation of the message layer.
1.1 OpenFlow
OpenFlow is an application layer protocol that operates over TCP/TLS. As shown
in Figure 1.3, the protocol separates the controller plane away from the networking
devices in order to achieve a more centralized control on an otherwise distributed
network. OpenFlow defines a set of common operations for controllers to configure
switch states. The OpenFlow controllers and switch exchange control messages to
carry out those operations.
Each OpenFlow message has an 8-byte header that is shared by all message types
4
OpenFlow Controller
OpenFlow Switch
TrafficTraffic
OpenFlow Messages
Figure 1.3: OpenFlow Controller and Switch
Figure 1.4: Structure for OpenFlow Header
from all released versions. As can be seen in Figure 1.4, the header specifies version,
type, length and transaction ID of the message. The structure of header has not
changed across all versions of OpenFlow. Several message types uses only the header
as the entire body. One example is echo request and echo reply messages types,
which are sent periodically to detect liveliness of the connection between the switch
and the controller.
OpenFlow operates at the level of flow. All packets with the same flow signature
belong to the same flow. Flow signatures are contained in a structure called Match.
Figure 1.5 shows the structure for Match in version 1.0. Packets are classified into
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Figure 1.5: Structure for Match in OpenFlow 1.0
different flows based on their destination/source MAC, IP and port, among other
packet information.
OpenFlow Actions specifies the policies on the flows. Some examples include
forwarding the packet to a specific port (type Output) and inserting the packet into
a particular queue in a packet (type Enqueue). Several policies can be applied on
the same flow by attaching a vector of Actions with various types in the end of flow
modification (Flow mod) messages. The structures for Action’s header and payload
are shown in Figures 1.6.
Packet in is a common message type issued by the switch to the controller. Its
main function is to query the controller for the action(s) for an unknown flow that
does not have an entry in the switch flow table. Its structure can be seen in Figure
1.7.
Flow mod is sent by the controller to the switch in order to modify the flow
table. Its structure can seen in Figure 1.8. Flow mod is arguably the most important
message type and it is sent from an OpenFlow controller to the switch in order to
6
Figure 1.6: Message Structure for OpenFlow Action Header
Figure 1.7: Message Structure for Packet in in OpenFlow 1.0
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Figure 1.8: Message Structure for Flow mod in OpenFlow 1.0
modify its flow table. It has a Match to classify the flows and a vector of Actions to
define policies on these flows.
1.2 Message Layer
Message layer performs message construction and serialization. It has several
major functions. As shown in Figure 1.9, the first one is to interpret the received
raw binary streams. Depending upon the interpretation, messages with certain types
need to be constructed using various data structures and stored into the memory
on the current networking device. Going the opposite direction, the second major
function is to turn the data structures in the memory that represent different types
of messages into a binary stream in order to be transmitted through the system
interface. Furthermore, the message layer is not only responsible for translating
between the binaries from NIC and data structures that contain those messages in
the device memory, but should also be able to determine the validity of incoming
messages. The validation should successfully accept well-formed messages and reject
ill-formed ones. Finally, it needs to coordinate with other modules in the stack
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Message LayerBinaries (NIC)
Constructing Message
Sending Message
Figure 1.9: Message Layer in Network Protocols
implementation. The message layer is being used by other major components of the
protocol. Thus, its ability to handle message safely and efficiently could affect the
entire stack.
Similar to TCP and UDP, OpenFlow is a binary protocol. There is also a group
of ASCII protocols such as HTTP. These ASCII protocols tend not to focus on
performance because of the fact that they process text strings instead of binaries.
However, even though OpenFlow is used as an example in this thesis, most of the
underlying ideas of conformance verification and performance evaluation proposed
in this work can be applied to both binary and ASCII protocols.
OpenFlow is an ideal protocol to be used as the example for message layer analysis
since its message structure is the most complex part of the protocol. The number of
types of messages in OpenFlow is much larger than protocols such as TCP. These
numbers can be seen in Table 1.1. The number increases from 22 in version 1.0 to 33
in version 1.4. Furthermore, it has gained tremendous popularity since its release.
This provides more existing open source implementations for examination of their
conformance and/or performance.
1.3 Related Works
Existing tools tends to focus on the entire protocol. They take a black box
approach to interact with the protocol implementation through its system interface.
It would be helpful to gain more insights by using a more white box approach to
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Table 1.1: OpenFlow Version vs. Number of Message Types.
Version # Msg Types
1.0 22
1.1 24
1.2 26
1.3 30
1.4 33
inspect only the message layer itself.
There are several existing open source testing tools for OpenFlow. They can be
catogorized into three major categories: functionality, performance, and applications.
Table 1.2 demonstrates the classification. Cbench [2] is a controller benchmarking
tool that measures the controller performance by simply injecting Packet in mes-
sages. OFLOPS [3] is a switch benchmarking tool. Similar to Cbench, it takes
a black box approach to test the performance. OFTest [4] and Test Specification
performs functional testing on switches with some examples on message structures.
SOFT [5] utilizes symbolic interpretation to find non-conformities between two im-
plementations and to detect protocol bugs through invariant violations. In terms
of application tools, NICE [6] and FlowChecker [7] are both concerned with finding
inconsistencies in applications or configurations. VeriFlow [8] attempts to examine
network-wide issues at real time. None of these tools focus on the conformance
or performance specifically to the message layer of OpenFlow. Meanwhile, having a
framework that better understands the conformance and performance at the message
layer can help these tools narrrow down the reasons for obtained results.
Several works perform bounds testing in general software engineering, such as
bounded exhaustive testing [9]. However, they have several limitations specific to
the message layer of network protocols. They tend to be ineffective in dealing with
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Table 1.2: Existing OpenFlow Tools
Performance Cbench, OFLOPS
Functionality OFTest, Test Specification 1.0, SOFT
Application NICE, FlowChecker, VeriFlow
dependencies in the structures among different fields, especially type and length,
which is prevalent in network protocols with type-length-value data structures. The
second limitation of these bounds testing works is that they do not understand
protocol semantics, such as checksum calculation in TCP.
In terms of actual test message generation, there are open source automated test-
ing tools that conduct fuzzing on fields and potentially produce input tests for the
message layer. However, most of them focus on value equality as opposed to repre-
sentation equality. Other than the guarantee on the equality of values, representation
equality guarantees the consistency in memory layout. For example, Figure 1.11 is
an example with version (1 byte), type (1 byte) and length (2 bytes), which are the
first three fields in the OpenFlow header, being read from the wire. However, if
the testing tool only provides value equality, depending upon the implementation,
the constructed structure in the memory can actually look like 1.10. They result
in a different bit stream in the memory because of the padding that is generated
in the process. A useful fuzzer for the message layer needs to have both value and
representation.
typeversion length
Figure 1.10: Example of Value Equality
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version type length
Figure 1.11: Example of Representation Equality
A small group of protocol fuzzers such as Sulley [10] also provide representational
equality. However, similar to bounds testing, they have limitations on understanding
protocol semantics. Thus, they do not possess the capability to fuzz over certain
types of structures, such as a vector of Actions or Instructions in OpenFlow since
each Action or Instruction can potentially have a different type.
Furthermore, there are other advantages of having a custom testing suite instead
of randomized testing. For example, potential space for input messages is large for
randomized testing messages produced by a protocol fuzzer. It would be compu-
tationally exhaustive to produce enough random test messages that have a good
coverage on the message layer. A verification methodology is proposed in this thesis
that can reduce the input space of testing messages. Messages generated with this
methodology can also pinpoint the exact issues in the message layer.
Finally, PacketTypes [11] and Binpac [12] address message layer from a language
perspective. They treat message formats as grammars of a domain specific language.
They impose a learning curve for the users. Furthermore, even though they generate
the source code, they do not generate test cases for verification.
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2. DESIGN CHOICES
Selection of design choices can not only influence the level of conformance, but
affect the performance of a message layer implementation as well. Understanding
the consequences of these choices can provide developers a more systematic approach
when it comes to implementing a message layer. The following is a sample of some
of the design trade-offs [13].
Degree of Validation: Constraints on a message that determine its validity
can be categorized as either structural or semantic. A structural constraint is vio-
lated if some value in the message contradicts what is known about the shape of the
message—whether the reported content accurately reflects the data actually read.
An example is a length field that indicates that a payload is larger than the mes-
sage actually received. A semantic constraint is violated when some value within
a message is not within the range of values required by the protocol specification,
such as unsafe casting of message types. An implementation should not process
messages with structural constraint violations, and it should be wary of semantic
constraint violations. Attempting to process these messages exposes the stack or its
client applications to potentially exploitable vulnerabilities.
In-place Interpretation vs. Copy: It is sometimes possible to construct a
message simply by interpreting a buffer as some other type, applying byte-ordering
transformations as required. Such an application of zero-copy can result in per-
formance boost. On the other hand, copying can often provide an extra layer of
protection on certain operations.
Eager vs. Lazy Evaluation: An example of eager vs. lazy can be semantic
validation of the OpenFlow message layer. Any field describing the structure of the
13
message must be validated. Otherwise, the stack could easily misinterpret arbitrary
data as meaningful, potentially leading to bugs and vulnerabilities. The validation
can be performed proactively to detect issues early on or lazily once the message has
been read into the memory.
Time vs. Size: A memory vs. time trade-off is where more memory is used
to achieve a faster execution time. On the other hand, the increase in the use of
memory can have negative impact on the performance. A potential reason can be
that with fixed size caches, more memory usage can lead to more cache misses. These
cache misses can come from both data and instruction caches.
An example of trade-off between memory and time can be inlining. A C/C++
implementation can rely heavily on inlining to improve performance at the expense of
binary executable size. With inlining, the function bodies of the callees are directly
copied into their callers. The same callees can be copied multiple times if they have
multiple callers. On the other hand, the overhead of function call setup for small
functions is reduced. This can potentially come at the expense of larger code size
and increases instruction cache miss rates.
2.1 Flowgrammable
The OpenFlow message layer implementation in this work is part of the Flow-
grammable OpenFlow stack. Flowgrammable [14], a Software-Defined Networking
startup, participated in the OpenFlow driver competition hosted by the Open Net-
work Foundation and was awarded as one of the finalists. The stack was designed
using a principled programming approach to produce safe and efficient code. A
C++11 program was developed to handle all message layer operations: construc-
tion, serialization, equality comparison, etc. The safety component ensures unsafe
messages, i.e., messages that violate structural or semantic constraints, will be han-
14
dled appropriately.
Buffer
View
Figure 2.1: Buffer and View in Flowgrammable
During the implementation of Flowgrammable stack, design choices were ex-
plored. In-place interpretation is not used in the Flowgrammable stack in order
to provide a guarantee of safe object construction. A constructed message object is
separate from the buffer from which it was read. Figure 2.1 shows this separation.
Figure 2.2 shows two major operations on the view: advance and constrain. When
the current interpretation is finished, the buffer is advanced by creating a new view
that has the next part of the message. On the other hand, constrain is used to limit
the access of view on the buffer.
This mechanism of providing a view on the buffer is a potential source of per-
formance degradation since it requires additional memory. However, the underlying
principle is that conformance and safety must not be sacrificed for performance, and
C++11 features such as move semantics are used to minimize the cost associated with
these copies. Move constructors and assignments use rvalue references to minimize
the overhead with decreasing the copying of temporary variables.
Furthremore, the Flowgrammable stack will lazily validate the non-structural
fields of messages. The reason is that there are a number of useful applications (e.g.,
message filters) that do not access every field of a message. Requiring immediate val-
15
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View
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Figure 2.2: Operations on Buffer View in Flowgrammable
idation would be a poor use of resources for such applications. Flowgrammable also
uses C++11’s compile-time capability to evaluate constexpr extensively to reduce
the runtime burden of computing message sizes and trivially validated constraints.
Finally, some frequently used smaller functions are being inlined in order to achieve
performance gain in terms of throughput.
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3. FRAMEWORKS
The quality of message layer is vital to the quality of the entire OpenFlow stack
since it is the most complex part of the protocol. For example, 70% of the 80K line-of-
code in the Flowgrammable implementation is dedicated solely to the message layer.
Furthermore, many of the other components in the stack, such as state machine and
system interface all need to utilize the message layer to process message information.
In order to gain confidence on the safety of an OpenFlow stack, its message layer
needs to be extensively tested to discover potential vulnerabilities and performance
inefficiencies. These issues can be resolved if the tests can pinpoint the exact location
where failure or inefficiency occurs.
3.1 Conformance Verification
Most software testing fuzzers provide value equality. However, they typically do
not provide representational equality (there are several exceptions), which means the
layout of those values in memory might not be the same even though the equality
of the values themselves are being guaranteed. Even with representational equality,
another drawback with automated fuzzing is that very little confidence can be gained
in each individual test case. Since the length field in the header is 2 bytes and any
message, whose size is defined by this length, can be 65536 bytes long, the input space
of possible testing messages becomes very large and infeasible to traverse through.
There are several fields that only have a few fixed values, such as version. However,
the small portion of those fields in the potential overall size does not help reduce the
input space by much. It can take automatic fuzz testing a long time to reach to a
satisfactory coverage. Thus, a heuristic is needed to reduce the input space size, and
yet produce test cases that can give us more confidence.
17
As mentioned in the Degree of Validation section of Design, constraints on mes-
sage layer can appear in two forms: structural and semantic. In the example from
Figure 3.1, since the length field indicates the size of payload, its constraint (length
no less than 8) is a structural constraint. On the other hand, constraints in the
payload field are semantic constraints if no further component structures depend on
it. Bounds are ending positions of a substructure in the memory (beginning and end
of payload indicated by the length field). Stepping outside the bounds causes failures
in interpreting the structure of the message. For example, in Figure 3.2, a length
field slightly less than or larger than what is needed for the payload will result in
a structural constraint violation. On the other hand, boundaries are the minimum
and maximum values of a field. Stepping outside the boundaries will not affect the
interpretation of the future messages from the network interface.
>= 8
PayloadLength 
2 bytes 
Figure 3.1: Illustration of Bounds and Boundaries
An example of stepping outside of bounds can be seen in Figure 3.2. The potential
structural violations on this bound can stem from either direction.
A more concrete OpenFlow example can be an Flow mod message in Version
1.0. The length of Flow mod is: 64 + the length of Actions in the end. The size
of the entire Flow mod message is defined in the length field of OpenFlow header,
which is affected by the size of each action that is specified in the length field of
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>= 8
PayloadLength 
2 bytes 
Figure 3.2: Illustration of Stepping Outside of Bounds and Boundaries
each action header. A length value that steps out of the bound (either longer or
shorter) will violate structural constraints by failing to capture the payload. On the
other hand, a flag value other than SendFlowRem, CheckOverlap or Emerg steps out
of the boundary of this field and is a semantic constraint violation. A violation on
this value will not cause failures in interpreting the remaining actions or subsequent
messages.
Violations on conformance most likely occur at the bounds and boundaries. Thus,
the strategy used in this work for conformance testing is to generate test messages
that address all bounds and boundaries. Ill-formed messages are intentionally created
to step out of the bounds (structural violations) or boundaries (semantic violations)
for each message type and its substructures. For example, an invalid Flow mod
message is created with a length field of 65 + the length of its Actions to result in
a structural failure. Another Flow mod message is created with an invalid value in
the flags field to cause a semantic failure. A conformant message layer should reject
all these invalid messages while accepting and correctly interpreting valid messages
that are free of either structural or semantic failures.
The hierarchy of OpenFlow messages can be modeled as a graph. All external
nodes represent fields in a message and their parent internal nodes represent the data
structures that group the children external nodes together. The call graph for version
1.0 that focuses on Flow mod can be seen in Figure 3.3. The payload structures for all
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(record)
header
version type length xid
message
(variant)
match
(record)
cookie ... flags actions
(vector)
wildcards ... tp_dst
action header
(record) (variant)
type length
port max_len
payload
flow_mod...
...
action payload
output ...
[1]
action
...
>= 64[0..21]
[0..2]
>= 8[0..11, 0xff]
[0..0xffef]
Figure 3.3: Call Graph of OpenFlow Message
other message types are being omitted in this graph due to space constraints. There
are three major types of internal nodes in the graph: record, variant and vector.
A record, such as Header and Match in version 1.0, only contains fixed size fields.
A variant has several options on its structures, which is determined during runtime,
often based upon the values in a type field in the earlier part of the message. A vector
contains a natural number of the same type, such as uninterpreted data in the end
of Packet in, or a natural number of a variant with different types, such as actions
embedded in the end of Flow mod that specifies the policies for this particular flow.
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There are many fields in the message layer of network protocols that has structural
implications for other parts of the messages. The valid values for all external nodes in
shown in Figure 3.3. These dependencies tend to be more than what general software
testing tools can efficiently handle and require understanding on the semantics of
protocol specifications. For example, in the case of OpenFlow, type often determines
the choice for the structure of a variant during runtime. Sometimes a message,
such as Statistics messages, requires multiples levels of variants to define its entire
structure. Length also has structural dependencies with other structures, such as the
number and types of actions in the end of Flow mod. Each of these fields would have
a range associated with it that specifies its bounds or boundaries. Each OpenFlow
version has a graph representation of its own.
header
message
payload: flow_mod
match ... actions
...
action header action payload: output
action1
version type length xid
wildcards tp_dst
cookie flags
type length port max_len
2*
1*
* - non-trivial constraints
10* 1000* 8*
0
15* 80* 1537
17
782
Figure 3.4: Example of OpenFlow Test Message Generation
The generation of OpenFlow test messages essentially is the preorder traversal of
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the graph. The visits on each type in a variant will result in multiple test messages
with each type has at least a positive and a negative message. An example message
can be seen in Figure 3.4. It is constructed through traversing the graph from Figure
3.3. All external nodes in the graph with non-trivial constraints have been marked
with a star. A value of 15 in the type field of record header determines that this is a
Flow mod message. It has an action with type output in the end, which is determined
by a type value of 8 in the actions header. This action in the end also leaves the
length field in the header with a value of 80. Because of the For each field that
has either structural (e.g., type and length in the header) or semantic implications
(e.g., flags), a negative message is generated by stepping right out of its bounds or
boundaries in any direction. This way, each of these negative messages focuses on a
particular issue in the message.
Algorithm 1 Test Case Generation
procedure generateTests(none)
traverse(root, null)
initialize(goodMessageQueue)
initialize(badMessageQueue)
end procedure
The starting point of the message generation process generation is shown in Al-
gorithms 1, which is the beginning of the preorder traversal on message tree at the
root. The other nodes will be visited in a recursive manner from here. Two message
queues are also being initialized. They store the outputs for good messages and bad
messages that target specific errors.
Algorithm 2 shows how the graph is being traversed in the processing of message
generation. A message is being constructed each time the traversal reaches the end
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Algorithm 2 Traverse a Node in the Graph
procedure traverse(node, message)
if node = null then
processMessageEnd(message)
end if
if node is internal then
processInternalNode(node)
else if node is a leaf then
processLeafNode(node)
end if
for child in children of node do
traverse(child, message)
end for
end procedure
of the tree. The handling of this part (processMessageEnd) will be shown later in
Algorithm 3. Each node in the graph can either be an internal node (ex: record,
variant, vector) or a leaf node. As described earlier, the children of internal nodes
consist of leaf nodes, which represent fields in messages. Handling of internal nodes
and leaf nodes are shown in Algorithms 4 and 5, respectively. Once the currently
visited node is being processed, each child of the node will be visited in the next
step.
Algorithm 3 Process the End of a Message
procedure processMessageEnd(message)
if isExisting(vector) then
update(length)
end if
if isValid(message) then
goodMessageQueue.enqueue(message)
else
badMessageQueue.enqueue(message)
end if
end procedure
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Algorithm 3 demonstrates the ending stage of a message generation. The valid
flag is being checked to see if this is a good message in order to determine the
appropriate output message queue it should be sent to. If vectors exist in the end,
length fields that are related to the size of the vectors need to be updated. For
example, in Figure 3.4, the length field is header is updated from 64 to 80 since there
is a non-empty vector of Actions in the end of the Flow mod message.
Algorithm 4 Process an Internal Node
procedure processInternalNode(node)
if node = variant then
node.children ← structure(type.value)
else if node = vector then
node.addChild(empty)
node.addChild(vector with max length)
if vector of the same type then
node.addChild(vector with multiple elements)
else if vector of variants then
node.addChild(vector with multiple variants)
end if
end if
end procedure
Algorithm 4 illustrates the processing of an internal node during tree traversal.
Special processing is needed for a node that is either a variant or a vector. If the
node is a variant, its branches are being trimmed and its only child is determined by
the value of its type defined previously. If the node is a vector, several children are
added to the node in order to achieve a good coverage.
Leaf node handling is shown in Algorithm 5. For each leaf node, if it has non-
trivial structural or semantic constraints, messages are generated with values ad-
dressing all bounds or boundaries of this node. If the constraints for a field are
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Algorithm 5 Process a Leaf Node
procedure processLeafNode(node)
if node has non-trivial constraints then
for bound/boundary in bounds/boundaries of node do
addMessages(node, message)
end for
else
for i ← 1,n do
message.append(random)
visitNextNode(node, message)
end for
end if
end procedure
trivial, meaning it will take any value to be valid, a random value will be used to ad-
vance the buffer in the message generation. A user input can be used to indicate how
many times a random value needs to be selected to fill a field with trivial constraints.
This will determine the size of the test message suite. A message is completed when
there are no leaf nodes left in the graph.
Algorithm 6 shows the addition of messages for a leaf node with non-trivial con-
straints. There are two types of non-trivial constraints: range constraints or named
constraints. Range constrains represent a set of valid values as long as they belong in
a specific range. Its bounds or boundaries are the maximum and minimum values of
the range. Some range constraints, such as length, only has one valid value. Named
constraints have an enumeration of valid values, all of which are bounds/boundaries.
Some examples include type and special port values (e.g., Controller). If the partially
constructed message is already an invalid message, since it is carefully designed to
fail at another point, only valid values will be filled in the remaining parts of the
message. On the other hand, for a message that is valid up to this point, new mes-
sages are created with valid and invalid values for the currently visited node before
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Algorithm 6 Add Messages at a Leaf Node
procedure addMessages(node, message)
if isValid(message) then
newGoodMessage ← message
newGoodMessage.append(node.validBound/Boundary)
visitNextNode(node, newGoodMessage)
newBadMessage ← message
newBadMessage.append(node.invalidBound/Boundary)
newBadMessage.valid ← false
visitNextNode(node, newBadMessage)
else // no other failures
newMessage ← message
newMessage.append(random)
visitNextNode(node, newMessage)
end if
end procedure
the traversal procedure advances to the next node. Each invalid value for the current
node should start stepping out of a bound or a boundary, depending on whether the
constraint is structural or semantic.
The generation of test message suite described above has no dependencies with
the type of applications the message layer will experience. Several types of variations
can be applied to the process of message suite generation. A possible variation of
this generation procedure can be a probabilistic adjustment to the type of traffic.
For example, type in the header can be weighted to include a higher percentage of
Flow mod and Packet in messages since these two messages tend to be used fre-
quently between the controller and the switch.
3.2 Performance Evaluation
The performance evaluation framework uses regular metrics including: dynamics
instruction count, cycles, branch prediction misses, cache misses, and throughput.
Existing tools are being used. The profiling tool Perf [15] is used to measure the
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performance of OpenFlow devices under test. It uses sampling and aggregates the
final results through these samples. There is a sweet spot for the sampling period.
Undersampling does not provide resolution for an accurate final output. On the other
hand, oversampling can negative impact the results due to sampling overhead. The
ideal sampling period is found to be around 1ms. Some of the benchmarking param-
eters include instructions, branch predictions and overall throughput. Several other
tools were used in the measurements. Valgrind [16] is used for some memory/cache
measurements, such as instruction cache and heap usage.
27
4. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In order to evaluate the efficacy of our approach to the design and implementation
of the message layer, a benchmarking framework is being constructed to support the
comparison of message layers in terms of protocol conformance and performance.
The framework consists of messages generated from the methodology described in
the Conformance Verification section. The test cases contain both conforming and
non-conforming messages, and the latter set contains messages with both structural
and semantic constraint violations. These test cases cover all bounds and boundaries
of OpenFlow message types and their substructures.
Other than Flowgrammable, the OpenFlow devices under test include Beacon
[17], CPqD Soft Switch versions 1.2 and 1.3 [18]. Beacon controller is a leading
SDN stack and Soft Switch is developed by CPqD, winner of the OpenFlow driver
competition. All the experiments are conducted on a Dell PowerEdge 720 server
(courtesy of Texas A&M IT Department). The server has an Intel Xeon E5 2637
processor and 8GB of RAM. The experiments are run on Ubuntu 12.04. The compiler
for C/C++ implementations (for Flowgrammable and Soft Switch) is gcc 4.8.1 with
optimization -O2. Java runtime (for Beacon) is OpenJRE with Java 6 update 27
based on IcedTea6 version 1.12.6.
Figure 4.1 shows the experimental setup. For each device that is under test,
its message layer source code is carefully examined and extracted from the entire
source code. The extracted code contains parts necessary to perform message layer
functions. The message layer testing constructs OpenFlow messages object for each
message in the test suite. For conformance verification, it records whether the con-
structions report success or failure against the expected results (positive and negative
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tests). For performance evaluation, it collects the output for measured metrics.
Message Layer
OpenFlow Device Code
Test Script Results
Conformance
Performance
OpenFlow Messages
Conformance
Performance
Figure 4.1: Experimental Setup
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5. RESULTS
This chapter describes data collected from the experiments. It includes results
for test generation, conformance verification and performance evaluation. The test
cases produced during test generation are used in both conformance and performance
experiments.
5.1 Test Cases
Using methodology described in the previous section, the generated test cases for
both structural and semantic testing from version 1.0 to version 1.3.1 can be seen
in Table 5.1. Later versions tend to have more test cases because of the increase
in the number of types and their complexities. It should also be noted that the
number of testing messages that targets structural constraints is much larger than
that of semantic constraints. The reason is that most of the constraints on the fields
have structural implications for other parts of the message. These messages are used
to prevent structural and semantic violations in messages. Each negative message
exposes a particular failure in the interpretation.
Table 5.1: Distribution of Generated Test Messages for Different Versions.
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3.1 Total
Positive 106 186 278 291 290 1151
Negative Structural 137 235 423 633 633 2061
Negative Semantic 21 24 33 33 39 150
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5.2 Performance Evaluation
Excluding semantic checking gives the stack the ability to accept soft failures
when it does not affect the processing of other structures. This can help improve
performance in certain situations. Table 5.2 shows the overhead of semantic checking
in the Flowgrammable stack. The overhead on the throughput is minimal. Major
statistics such as instruction count, cycle count and branch misses do not change
with or without semantic checking. This shows that the accuracy does not need to
be traded for time in Flowgrammable stack. However, this minimal difference in
throughput here can be larger with other types of OpenFlow traffic or with other
implementations for other network protocols. It would still be interesting to include
an evaluation for semantic checking overhead in order to determine whether it is
worthwhile to trade accuracy for time in certain situations.
Table 5.2: Semantic Checking Overhead on Flowgrammable Message Layer.
w/o Semantic w Semantic
Dynamic instruction count 51,059,684,477 51,075,452,267
Cycle count 32,724,713,505 32,811,718,428
IPC 1.56 1.56
Branch count 11,437,138,342 11,440,761,046
Branch mispredictions 25,361,867 25,888,803
Branch misprediction rate 0.22% 0.23%
Execution time 9.89s 9.93s
Avg msg/s 53,380 53,184
Avg throughput 2.25Gbps 2.24Gbps
Avg msg latency 19µs 19µs
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Inlining smaller functions can increase code size due to the multiples copies of the
body of those functions. This might cause an increase in instruction cache misses due
to the increase in static instructions. On the other hand, direct copying of function
bodies can increase the average number of instructions in a branch, which tends to
have fewer branch prediction misses. However, such a trade-off between instruction
cache miss and branch prediction miss is not occurring in the Flowgrammable stack.
The reason is that the code size actually decreased with inlining. Such a phenomenon
is caused by the fact that most inlined functions belong to a specific message type and
they are only being copied once (ex: message byte calculation). The number of static
instructions decreases by about 1% (Table 5.3) with fewer callq and retq instructions.
Coupling with the fact that an increase of approximately 8% in instructions per
branch (4.64 vs 4.30), inlining increases the throughput for about 5%.
Even though inlining in this case does not involve a trade-off between instruction
cache usage and branch prediction, it can still occur in other situations. Too much
inlining may even hurt the overall performance. It would be useful to evaluate
the impact of inlining on the throughput to determine whether a trade-off between
memory and speed is beneficial.
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Table 5.3: Inlining Overhead on Flowgrammable Message Layer.
w/o Inlining w Inlining
Dynamic instruction count 53,574,927,228 51,075,452,267
Static instruction count 249,017 246,434
Cycle count 35,046,075,476 32,811,718,428
IPC 1.53 1.56
Branch count 12,349,371,439 11,440,761,046
Branch mispredictions 26,653,382 25,888,803
Branch misprediction rate 0.22% 0.23%
Instructions per branch 4.34 4.64
Instruction cache miss 82,522,436 82,014,764
Execution time 10.47s 9.93s
Avg msg/s 50,446 53,184
Avg throughput 2.13Gbps 2.24Gbps
Avg msg latency 20µs 19µs
Code size 1.53MB 1.49MB
Heap usage 4,411,015,389 bytes 4,411,015,389 bytes
Optimization on common operations can be explored for performance improve-
ment. Header processing is a type of common operations in message layer since every
packet will have a header. Each time the Beacon controller receives an OpenFlow
message from an OpenFlow-capable controller, its OpenFlow stack implementation
module reads and interpret the header of each message twice. The first time it
determines message type and whether the buffer has enough space for a message
whose size is specified the length field. Then, it instantiates the payload object and
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allocates memory for the structure based upon the type. Afterwards, it moves the
pointer in the buffer back to the beginning of the message. The potential inefficiency
here lies in some unnecessary extra processing for the first header interpretation,
during which transaction ID is not being used by the interpretation. Thus, a poten-
tial optimization on Beacon can be skipping transaction ID during the first header
interpretation.
Test messages that are about 65KB in length are not being included in this ex-
periment in order not to virtually eliminate header overhead due to large packet size.
After excluding those long messages, t he average packet size decreases to about 136
bytes. The results show that optimizing the header improves performance by about
3% (Table 5.4), which corresponding to the size of transaction ID (4 bytes) in the av-
erage packet size. Even though this particular example of header optimization does
not improve the performance drastically because of the header length and message
size, header processing optimization could still substantially improve performance in
many other cases.
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Table 5.4: Beacon Header Processing Optimization.
w/o Optimization w Optimization
Dynamic ins count 38,409,868,843 37,748,135,092
Cycle count 33,817,454,266 33,779,591,010
IPC 0.88 0.89
Branch count 6,174,352,333 6,169,341,454
Branch mispredictions 138,487,422 137,983,068
Branch misprediction rate 2.24% 2.24%
Execution time 10.69s 10.41s
Avg msg/s 90,513 92,990
Avg throughput 1.00Gbps 1.02Gbps
Avg msg latency 11µs 11µs
5.3 Conformance Verification
Table 5.5: Conformance Verification Results.
Beacon 1.0 Soft Switch 1.2 Soft Switch 1.3 Flowgrammable
Structural failures 3.7% 31.8% 38.1% 0%
Semantic failures 28.8% 15.7% 47.8% 0%
The passing percentage of conformance verification test cases for different stacks
can be seen in Table 5.5: Most of the failures in Beacon are the result of seman-
tic violations. For example, the value of reason field in Packet in, Flow removed,
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Port status messages; the value of command filed in Flow mod; the flag field in
Flow mod, Get config res, and Set config are not being verified by the message layer
of Beacon controller’s OpenFlow stack.
Most of the failures in Soft Switch come from the fact that it does not reject
messages with shorter lengths than in the buffer in hope that the extra bits will be
carried into the next message. Some other failed test cases include invalid length of
table feature. Table feature is a type of Statistics query on the flow table. Unlike
other parts of the message in which length field is included as part of the value
specified by it, table feature’s length is not inclusive of it.
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6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Flowgrammable produced a strong and conformant message layer that helps
award them the finalist for the OpenFlow driver competition. It creates a confor-
mance verification framework that generates test cases covering bounds and bound-
aries of all message types. The same conformance framework is being used to evaluate
and discover issues in several other OpenFlow stack implementations. Some design
choices in Flowgrammable and Beacon are being explored. Their performances are
measured to observe the impact of those design choices. Even though some design
choices do not lead to a large performance difference in this case, understanding
them will still help developers achieve more efficient and safer implementations of
the message layer of networking protocols in general.
The work can be extended in many different directions. A tool to synthesize
and automate the implementation can also help provide a unified interface to con-
formance and performance frameworks. Some other design choices can be explored.
For example, the effects of shifting computation in time, such as lazily evaluating the
length of a message, can be studied. A tool that can synthesize and automate the
message layer will be able to help facilitate this since time consuming manual modi-
fication of the implementation can be minimized. The same analysis on conformance
and performance can be conducted on other OpenFlow stack implementations such
as Floodlight controller [19], Ryu controller [20], and Open vSwitch [21]. The same
procedures can also be repeated on other network protocols. Traffic through test
bed in more realistic scenarios can help study the impact of design choices on perfor-
mance in various networking applications. This can be done by building a physical
OpenFlow network or in a virtual network such as GENI [22]. Finally, hardware
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acceleration can be taken into consideration. The main goal will be to identify the
bottle neck in the instruction level, meaning recognizing the most frequently used in-
structions during construction, serialization and resource management in the message
layer. These bottlenecks can be then tackled with specialized hardware accelerators.
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